Blog — Galanda Broadman

Gabe Galanda Named Western Washington University Distinguished Alumnus

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On May 18, 2018, Western Washington University will honor Gabriel “Gabe” Galanda as a Distinguished Alumnus.

Gabe is being recognized for his staunch advocacy for Indian civil rights protection, especially in the context of tribal disenrollment.  He maintains that traditional indigenous kinship norms should over-ride colonial rules for tribal belonging, most notably blood quantum.

Last October, Gabe delivered a campus-wide lecture at Western titled, “Restoring Indigenous Kinship Amidst America’s Nationalist Movement.” He believes that indigenous kinship norms—rooted in family and place—provide a path towards resolution of America’s current identity crisis.

Last week Gabe delivered a speech at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, “Re-imagining Tribal Citizenship,” in which he urged indigenous peoples in America to restore traditional kinship rules and norms for purposes of self-rule, including determinations regarding who belongs to tribal communities.

As Indian Country Today Media Network observed when naming Gabe as one of “50 Faces of Indian Country” in 2016, he has emerged nationally “as one of the most outspoken critics of the practice” of disenrollment, the “roots of [which] lie in colonialism, not indigeneity.”

In 2015, Gabe co-authored a 92-page law review article, “Curing the Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy.”  His article was recently named one of the Top 100 pieces of indigenous legal rights scholarship.

Gabe has defended nearly 600 Indians against disenrollment, including having kept the Nooksack 306 where they belong since 2013; obtained a “watershed decision” for 66 Grand Ronde Chief Tumulth Descendants; and protected 132 Elem Pomo Indians from being exiled, which would empty their Reservation.

Gabe was born and raised in Port Angeles, Washington.  In 1995, he received his A.A. from Peninsula College, where he served as Associate Student Body President.  He received his B.A. in English Literature from Western in 1997, and his J.D. from the James E. Rogers College of Law at the University of Arizona in Tucson, in 2000.  At Arizona, he served as President of the Native American Law Students Association.

Gabriel S. Galanda is the managing lawyer of Galanda Broadman, PLLC, in Seattle. Gabe is a descendant of the Nomlaki and Concow Tribes, belonging to the Round Valley Indian Tribes of Northern California.  He can be reached at (206) 300-7801 or gabe@galandabroadman.com.

"We were not 'governments' in 1492....We were kinship societies."

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This blog is based on a talk that Gabe Galanda gave at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, in conjunction with Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development forum, "The Next Horizon," on May 1st. Gabe thanks Seattle City Councilwoman Debora Juarez, Dr. David Wilkins, and Professors Robert Williams, Matthew Fletcher, and Eric Eberhard for their teachings and research insights.
"The culture comes from the language." -- Darrell R. Kipp, Blackfeet

We were not “governments” in 1492. 

We were not “nations” in 1787. 

We were not “citizens” in 1823 or 1832.

We were kinship societies when Columbus arrived to Haiti, when the framers drafted the Constitution, and when Chief Justice John Marshall authored the Marshall Trilogy. 

We belonged to our societies as members, as in family members, not as citizens.

We were self-governing, but we were not governments.

“Native nations” and “tribal citizens” are racial formations, established by the colonizer under its processes—not ours.

Native nationhood was the mode by which Treaties and other laws could be forged to dispossess us of our lands—it was a mode of annihilation.

Native nationhood, to the extent exclusive of traditional kinship norms, remains a mode by which indigenous peoples will be extinguished.

If we continue to determine who belongs through use of racial formations, rather than through kinship rules, we will eventually be terminated.  Just look at the Trump Administration’s most recent treatment of tribes as a racial group for federal Medicaid reimbursement purposes.

Unless we return to the ways of kinship, we will eventually cease to exist.

Who were we?

Vine Deloria, Jr.’s auntie, Ella Deloria, said it best, writing from New York City in 1944:

All peoples who live communally must first find some way to get along together harmoniously and with a measure of decency and order.  This is a universal problem.  Each people, even the most primitive have solve it in its own way.  And that way, by whatever rules and controls it is achieved, is, for any people, the scheme of life that worked, The Dakota people of the past found a way: it was through kinship.

Kinship was the all-important matter.  Its demands and dictates for all phases of social life were relentless and exact . . . . By kinship all Dakota people were held together in a great relationship that was theoretically all-inclusive and co-extensive with the Dakota domain.  Everyone who was born a Dakota belonged in it; nobody need be left outside. . .

[T]he ultimate aim of Dakota life, stripped of accessories, was quite simple: One must obey kinship rules; one must be a good relative. . . . In the last analysis every other consideration was secondary—property, personal ambition, glory, good times, life itself. . .

[T]hose who kept the rules consistently and gladly, this honoring all their fellows, were good Dakotas—meaning good citizens of society, meaning persons of integrity and reliability.  And that was practically all the government there was.

“Speaking of Indians,” "Part II, 'A Scheme of Law That Worked,'" at pp. 25-32.

Illustrating the still pervasive universal nature of kinship and belonging at birth, as Ms. Deloria described, are Articles 9 and 22 of of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which provide respectively:

Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community.

Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions.

Rather ironically, under the colonizer’s words governing its own citizens' belonging, citizenship is guaranteed, quite simply, to all who are born unto the land known today as the United States.  That bedrock American rule is established by the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and affirmed by 5 U.S.C. 1402, titled “Nationals and citizens of United States at birth.”

Pre-conquest we, too, were inclusive peoples, who identified and governed according to very simple but exacting kinship rules.  But those ancient rules began to vanquish in the 19th Century.

How did we become "nations"?

In 1823, in Johnson v. McIntosh, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, immediately before declaring us “fierce savages,” observed: “When conquest is complete . . . the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the conquerors, or safely governed as a distinct peoples.”

By 1831, he “denominated” us “domestic dependent nations,” in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.  Whether as "savages" or "dependent nations," these are racial formations from which modern Native nationhood has evolved. 

Exclaiming the United States' racial subjugation of indigenous peoples, the following year in Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall explained:

The words ‘treaty’ and ‘nation' are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning.  We have applied them to Indians . . .

The “our” and “we” is the colonizer.  Words like “nation” were the colonizer’s—not ours.

Lest you have any doubt about that term, as applied to the then so-called Cherokee Nation in Worcester, consider Professor Rennard Strickland’s words in “Fire and Spirits”:

Englishmen were looking for Native versions of British courts and . . . concluded, in a supreme gesture of ethnocentrism, that the Cherokees had no system of law.

In truth, the Cherokee conception of law was simply different from the more traditional Western idea of law.  To the Cherokees law was the early representation of a divine spirit order. . .

The ongoing social process could not, in the Cherokee way, be manipulated by law to achieve policy goals.  There was no question of man being able to create law because to the Cherokee the norms of behavior were a sovereign command from the Spirit World.  Man might apply to the divinely ordained rules, but no earthly authority, was empowered to formulate rules of tribal conduct.

Indeed, treaties and positive law, including those establishing tribal “nationhood” and “government” in the 1800s, were then the colonizer’s words and ways—not ours.

As to Cherokee kinship and belonging, Professor Strickland offers these words:

Society is divided into separate classes and ranks which were created by the Spirits.  There is no significant stigma attached to class membership.  All classes, both men and women, are of great value socially and have important and useful roles in Cherokee society. . . .

Legal norms existed on four levels among ancient Cherokees. . . .

The first of the norms were those governing relationships between man and the supernatural—the Spirit Beings.  Second were the norms prescribing conduct of the individual Indian towards specific public order, issues relating to the entire village or tribe.  Next were the norms concerning clan rights and duties.  Finally, there were a limited number of norms on individual or personal questions.

In other words, kinship rules and norms pervaded, until the Marshall Trilogy took hold.

How did we cease self-rule by kinship?

Aided by the Marshall Trilogy's discovery doctrine and native nationhood model, Treaties and the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 were promulgated.  Each of those federal laws were intended to, and operated to, pulverize our kinship ties to multi-millions of acres of homelands. 

The Dawes Rolls, created by the U.S. in only six months and thus demonstrably incomplete and incorrect, were especially destructive to kinship.  Kinship societies-turned-tribes have since used those federal rolls as their so-called base rolls—as the foundation of who belongs, or doesn’t.

Then in 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), deciding for tribes, who belongs to tribes, declaring Indians to be “members” if ½ degree or more of "blood quantum" and if in residence on reservations. 

Blood quantum is a racial fiction; one's human blood doesn't segregate mathematically.

Residence, although once a predominate form of kinship, took on a new meaning after arbitrary lines were drawn by the colonizer to concentrate Indian homelands onto reservations, in order to allow Manifest Destiny to flourish from coast to coast.

Now, 85 years later, the colonizer’s membership rules—and norms—indeed racism and classism—have supplanted kinship rules.  That is why we refer to ourselves as a race of “full bloods,” “half bloods,” and “mixed bloods”; and classes of “res Indians,” “off-res Indians,” and “urban Indians.”

Under the IRA, family members became political members of tribal constitutional governments and corporate entities, particularly under boilerplate constitutions and corporate charters foisted upon tribes by John Collier and his followers, including a nascent National Congress of American Indians.  Under those new tribal laws, tribal relatives can be “disenrolled” from the tribe. 

I have yet to discover an indigenous word that translates even close the word “disenrollment,” exclaiming the wholly foreign nature of that concept to us as indigenous peoples.

How did money over-rule kinship?

Dating back to the federal Lacey Act of 1906 and continuing through the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) of 1988, belonging has been increasingly individualized and monetized, through “pro rata” or “per capita” distributions of tribal communal wealth, by tribes to tribal members. That federally designed regime is also intended to pulverize us into oblivion. 

In fact, fueled by that new individual wealth, and corresponding graft and greed, 15% of today’s federally recognized tribes have disenrolled their kin.  In the case of the Elem Colony of Pomo Indians, tribal politicians are attempting to disenroll 100% of the tribe’s on-Colony population.  They are purportedly legislating themselves into oblivion. It is self-termination.

Addled by per capita greed, tribes are also imposing enrollment moratoria, meaning no longer enrolling or including their children among those who belong. 

Think about that for a minute. 

We talk, almost tritely, of the sustaining as indigenous peoples for sake of the Seven Generations.  Yet an increasing number of tribes are severing inter-generational kinship ties.  They are disowning their Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Generations.

In today's final analysis, kinship is secondary—to money. Venal exclusion has supplanted traditional inclusion.

Where do we go from here?

We cannot throw out the Native nationhood model.  Or abrogate Treaties, or IRA Constitutions or Bylaws.  Or abandon tribal capitalism via economic development. 

Tribes would be terminated without the modern nation-to-nation relationship; without Treaties as the Supreme Law of the Land per the U.S. Constitution; or without economic resources and the political power that accompanies those dollars.

Kinship, however, must be infused into Native nationhood, and throughout Native nation institutions as we know them today. 

In particular, we must use traditional kinship norms to define ourselves and our belonging.  That can mean maintaining the rubric and language of citizenship and IRA membership, if necessary.  

But we cannot self-define who belongs according to the Dawes Rolls or other federal censuses, or blood quantum, or colonial residential criteria, or gaming per capita checks.

We cannot allow racism, classism, individualism, nor capitalism to self-define us any longer.

We must re-define ourselves according to kinship rules.  We must re-define ourselves according to birthright.  We must re-define ourselves according to spiritual and cultural indigenous norms. 

If we do not, our nascent Native nations will rot from our core, until we eventually fall.

Gabriel S. Galanda is the managing lawyer of Galanda Broadman, PLLC, in Seattle. Gabe is a descendant of the Nomlaki and Concow Tribes, belonging to the Round Valley Indian Tribes of Northern California.  He can be reached at (206) 300-7801 or gabe@galandabroadman.com.

 

 

9th Circuit Says Jurors Needn’t Read Jailers’ Minds to Find Liability

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By Ryan Dreveskracht

On Monday, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear that jurors do not need to be mind-readers when it comes to determining whether adequate medical care was provided to pretrial detainees. In clarifying that these Fourteenth Amendment claims must be evaluated under an objective standard—as opposed to the Eighth Amendment’s subjective standard—the Court significantly eased the burden on § 1983 plaintiffs.

In Farmer v. Brennan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" clause jail employees must "take reasonable measures to guarantee" an inmate's safety, which includes providing "adequate . . . medical care."  511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).  The Court then articulated a two-prong inquiry for determining whether this standard is violated. 

First, the jury must consider whether a person is detained “under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm."  Id. at 834.  Second, the jailers who put the inmate in those conditions must both "know[] of" and purposefully disregard those conditions.    Id. at 837.  In other words, the jury must go into jailers' heads and determine (1) whether they actually believed the inmate was put at an increased risk of harm or death, and (2) whether the jailer made the conscious decision to keep the inmate in harm’s way despite that risk.  As the Court observed, under this test a jailer could escape liability under the second prong if he or she “knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.”  Id. at 844.  Or, alternatively, a jailer so aware would not be liable if he or she “responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id.

Four years later, in Frost v. Agnos, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[b]ecause pretrial detainees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners' rights under the Eighth Amendment . . . we apply the same standards."  152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).  Other Courts of Appeal held likewise, refusing to "distinguish between Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment standards."  Funchess v. John Doe #1, No. 96-4767, 1997 WL 12785, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1997).  In other words, the law did not distinguish between convicted felons serving their sentence and pretrial detainees not convicted of anything—Farmer's subjective test applied to everyone.

Then, in 2015, the Supreme Court decided Kingsley v. Hendrickson, holding, in relevant part:

In deciding whether the force deliberately used [by the officer on the pretrial detainee] is, constitutionally speaking, “excessive,” should courts use an objective standard only, or instead a subjective standard that takes into account a defendant's state of mind?  It is with respect to this question that we hold that courts must use an objective standard.  In short, . . . a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.

135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472-73 (2015).  Since "a subjective standard will be more demanding, requiring the plaintiff to allege specific facts that shed light on the defendant's mental state, rather than more general notions of what should have been objectively clear," Kingsley's application of the objective test to Fourteenth Amendment excessive force cases was a huge step forward for civil rights plaintiffs.  Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 454 (3d Cir. 2017).

Shortly after Kingsley, in Castro v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit held that Kingsley's Fourteenth Amendment objective test applied to "failure to protect" cases, as well as those where officers use excessive force.  833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016).  As the Castro court explained:

Excessive force applied directly by an individual jailer and force applied by a fellow inmate can cause the same injuries, both physical and constitutional. Jailers have a duty to protect pretrial detainees from violence at the hands of other inmates, just as they have a duty to use only appropriate force themselves. . . . [T]here are significant reasons to hold that the objective standard applies to failure-to-protect claims as well.

What followed was an erratic series of rulings by district courts “on whether to extend the objective reasonableness standard of review set forth in Kingsley to cases of pretrial detainees that do not involve the use of excessive force (i.e., cases challenging medical treatment . . . ).”  Castillo v. Dubose, No. 14-0987, 2017 WL 3765772, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Jul. 31, 2017) (quotation omitted).  In the Ninth Circuit, district courts that addressed Kingsley's objective standard applied it with hesitancy, holding, for example, that "factual allegations are sufficient under either standard."  Williams v. Cty., No. 15-1760, 2016 WL 4745179, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2016); see also Bremer v. Cty. of Contra Costa, No. 15-1895, 2016 WL 6822011, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016) ("The Court need not decide whether the subjective or objective standard applies here as no reasonable jury could find the Individual Defendants were deliberately indifferent under either standard.").  Defendants, of course, continued to argue that a subjective standard should be applied in all but excessive force and failure-to-protect cases, while inmates and the families of deceased inmates argued that the less-demanding objective standard applied.

Then, on Monday, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order that provided clarity once and for all.  In Gordon v. Cty. of Orange the court expressly held that that "claims for violations of the right to adequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard."  No. 16-56005, 2018 WL 1998296, at *5 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 2018). 

Gordon leaves jurors no longer needing to read jailers’ minds in order to find them liable for failure to render medical care to inmates.

Ryan Dreveskracht is an attorney with Galanda Broadman, PLLC, in Seattle.  His practice includes civil rights litigation against jails and prisons for their unlawful treatment of inmates.  He can be reached at (206) 909-3842 or ryan@galandabroadman.com.